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Key
revelations
from Bob
Woodward’s
new
book:
Trump
secretly
sent
covid
tests to
Putin
during
2020
shortage
By Isaac
Stanley-Becker
13–17
minutes
As the
coronavirus
tore
through
the
world in
2020,
and the
United
States
and
other
countries
confronted
a
shortage
of tests
designed
to
detect
the
illness,
then-President
Donald
Trump
secretly
sent
coveted
tests to
Russian
President
Vladimir
Putin
for his
personal
use.
Putin,
petrified
of the
virus,
accepted
the
supplies
but took
pains to
prevent
political
fallout
— not
for him,
but for
his
American
counterpart.
He
cautioned
Trump
not to
reveal
that he
had
dispatched
the
scarce
medical
equipment
to
Moscow,
according
to a new
book by
Washington
Post
associate
editor
Bob
Woodward.
Putin,
according
to the
book,
told
Trump,
“I don’t
want you
to tell
anybody
because
people
will get
mad at
you, not
me.”
Four
years
later,
the
personal
relationship
between
the two
men
appears
to have
persisted,
Woodward
reports,
as Trump
campaigns
to
return
to the
White
House
and
Putin
orchestrates
his
bloody
assault
on
Ukraine.
In early
2024,
the
former
president
ordered
an aide
away
from his
office
at
Mar-a-Lago,
his
private
club and
residence
in
Florida,
so he
could
conduct
a
private
phone
call
with the
Russian
leader,
according
to
Woodward’s
account.
The book
does not
describe
what the
two men
purportedly
discussed,
and it
quotes a
Trump
campaign
official
casting
doubt on
the
supposed
contact.
But the
unnamed
Trump
aide
cited in
the book
indicated
that the
GOP
standard-bearer
may have
spoken
to Putin
as many
as seven
times
since
Trump
left the
White
House in
2021.
These
interactions
between
Trump
and the
authoritarian
leader
of a
country
at war
with an
American
ally
form the
basis of
Woodward’s
conclusion
that
Trump is
worse
than
Richard
M.
Nixon,
whose
presidency
was
undone
by the
Watergate
scandal
exposed
a
half-century
ago by
Woodward
and his
Washington
Post
colleague
Carl
Bernstein.
“Trump
was the
most
reckless
and
impulsive
president
in
American
history
and is
demonstrating
the very
same
character
as a
presidential
candidate
in
2024,”
Woodward
writes
in the
book,
“War,”
which is
set to
be
released
Oct. 15.
Trump
campaign
spokesman
Steven
Cheung
said,
“None of
these
made-up
stories
by Bob
Woodward
are
true,”
issuing
a string
of
personal
attacks
on the
author
and
saying
Trump
didn’t
give him
an
interview
for the
book.
Cheung
argued
that the
book
“either
belongs
in the
bargain
bin of
the
fiction
section
of a
discount
bookstore
or used
as
toilet
tissue.”
With
publication
on the
eve of
the
presidential
election,
Woodward,
who has
chronicled
the
successes
and
failures
of U.S.
presidents
for 50
years,
concludes
that
Trump is
unfit
for
office
while
President
Joe
Biden
and his
team,
mistakes
notwithstanding,
exhibited
“steady
and
purposeful
leadership.”
Vice
President
Kamala
Harris,
the
Democratic
presidential
nominee,
makes
several
appearances
in the
narrative,
with
Woodward
presenting
her as a
shrewd
and
loyal
No. 2 to
Biden
but not
an
influential
voice in
his
administration’s
foreign
policy.
The book
is
Woodward’s
fourth
since
Trump’s
upset
victory
in 2016.
It
focuses
principally
on the
twin
wars
consuming
Biden’s
national
security
team —
Russia’s
all-out
war in
Ukraine,
which
began in
February
2022,
and
Israel’s
campaign
against
Hamas
and
other
Iranian-backed
proxies
since
the
Hamas
attacks
of Oct.
7, 2023.
The book
also
examines
the long
shadow
cast by
Trump
over the
foreign
conflicts
of the
past
four
years
and over
the
bitter
U.S.
political
environment
in which
they
have
unfolded.
And it
includes
candid
assessments
by Biden
of his
own
missteps,
including
his
decision
to make
Merrick
Garland
attorney
general.
Reacting
to the
prosecution
of his
son
Hunter —
by a
special
prosecutor
named by
Garland
amid
partisan
recriminations
over the
Justice
Department’s
prosecution
of Trump
— the
president
told an
associate,
“Should
never
have
picked
Garland.”
Woodward
reveals
how
Biden
weighed
his fate
before
exiting
the
presidential
race in
July,
including
over
lunch
earlier
that
month
with
Antony
Blinken,
his
secretary
of
state.
Blinken,
reports
Woodward,
warned
Biden in
the
private
dining
room off
the Oval
Office
that
everyone’s
legacy
is
reduced
to a
single
sentence
— and
that, if
he
continued
to
campaign
and lost
to
Trump,
that
would be
his
legacy.
Still,
Blinken
believed
at the
end of
the meal
that the
president
was
leaning
toward
staying
in the
race,
underscoring
how
unpredictable
Biden’s
decision-making
remained
until
the
final
moment.
“War”
illuminates
the
frantic,
and
often
failed,
effort
by
Biden’s
team to
prevent
escalation
of
fighting
in the
Middle
East —
fighting
that the
president
came to
see as
inseparable
from
Israeli
Prime
Minister
Benjamin
Netanyahu’s
political
fortunes,
and from
political
dynamics
in the
United
States,
too.
According
to
Woodward,
one of
Trump’s
national
security
advisers,
Keith
Kellogg,
secretly
met with
Netanyahu
during a
trip to
Israel
earlier
this
year.
Upon his
return,
Kellogg
publicly
circulated
a memo
effectively
blaming
Biden
for the
Hamas-led
attack
on
Israel,
writing,
“This
visit
reinforced
that the
Biden
Administration’s
erosion
of U.S.
deterrence
globally
and its
failed
policies
vis-à-vis
Iran
have
opened
America
up to a
regional
war in
the
Middle
East
with
devastating
consequences
for our
ally
Israel.”
At the
time,
Biden
advisers
were
pushing
Israel’s
leaders
to agree
to a
cease-fire
deal as
part of
an
effort
to head
off an
invasion
of
Rafah,
in the
southern
Gaza
Strip.
Their
entreaties
were
futile;
the
Rafah
offensive
began in
May. No
one felt
the
limits
of the
administration’s
ability
to
restrain
Israel
more
acutely
than
Blinken.
“It was
obvious
Blinken
had no
influence,”
Woodward
writes.
On
Ukraine,
too,
Trump’s
influence
was
pronounced,
even
from his
home at
Mar-a-Lago.
The
former
president’s
resistance
to
funding
Kyiv’s
war
effort
created
a
blockade
on GOP
support
in the
House.
This
past
spring,
House
Speaker
Mike
Johnson
(R-La.)
was able
to
persuade
Trump to
soften
his
stance,
according
to
Woodward,
not by
showing
him that
Ukraine’s
cause
was
just,
but by
convincing
him that
the aid
package
would
help the
Republican
conference’s
electoral
chances
and thus
benefit
him
personally
in the
run-up
to the
November
election.
“War”
offers
several
snapshots
of
Harris,
always
in a
supporting
role to
Biden
and
hardly
determining
foreign
policy
herself.
The book
recounts
how
Harris
sought
to spur
French
President
Emmanuel
Macron
into
action
in the
fall of
2021, in
preparation
for what
the U.S.
intelligence
community
indicated
would be
a
significant
Russian
military
action
against
Ukraine.
So, too,
the vice
president
made her
case to
Ukrainian
President
Volodymyr
Zelensky
at the
Munich
Security
Conference
in
February
2022,
going so
far as
to press
him to
develop
a
succession
plan
ensuring
stability
“if
you’re
captured
or
killed,”
as she
put it.
And the
book
reveals
how her
forceful
public
tone
following
a
meeting
in July
with
Netanyahu
—
pledging
that she
would
“not be
silent”
about
Palestinian
suffering
—
contrasted
with her
more
amicable
approach
in
private.
The
difference,
according
to
Woodward,
infuriated
Netanyahu,
who was
taken
aback by
her
public
remarks.
From the
Israeli
viewpoint,
however,
Harris
had
little
responsibility
for the
administration’s
approach
to the
conflict.
“Until
now, I
didn’t
feel
that
Vice
President
Harris
had any
impact
on our
issues,”
Michael
Herzog,
the
Israeli
ambassador
in
Washington,
is
quoted
as
saying
about
the
period
before
Harris
replaced
Biden on
the
ticket.
“She was
in the
room,
but she
never
had an
impact.”
As for
Trump’s
own
decision-making
process
on
foreign
affairs
when he
was
commander
in
chief,
the book
shows
how he
took in
a wide
range of
viewpoints,
including
from
people
without
relevant
expertise.
During a
high-level
meeting
about
Afghanistan
held at
one
point in
the
Situation
Room,
Trump
went
around
the
table to
ask
everyone’s
opinion.
“Mr.
President,
I’m the
notetaker,”
one
person
deflected.
“Oh,
no,”
Trump
replied,
“if
you’re
in this
room,
you’re
talking.”
The
notetaker
briefly
shared
her
views.
“War”
presents
the
withdrawal
from
Afghanistan,
in the
summer
of 2021,
as a
wound
for the
Biden
administration
that
would
shape
its
response
to other
international
flash
points.
The
debacle,
in which
U.S.
intelligence
failed
to
foresee
how
quickly
the
Taliban
would
seize
power,
elicited
sympathy
from the
architect
of the
initial
2001
invasion,
George
W. Bush,
who told
Biden,
according
to the
book:
“Oh boy,
I can
understand
what
you’re
going
through.
I got
[expletive]
by my
intel
people,
too.”
Woodward
contrasts
the
intelligence
failure
in
Afghanistan
to the
remarkable
insight
gained
by
American
spies
into
Russian
plans
ahead of
its
full-scale
invasion
of
Ukraine
in 2022.
U.S.
capabilities,
Woodward
reports,
included
a human
source
inside
the
Kremlin.
The book
shows
how
Biden’s
early
decisions,
which
were
sometimes
in
conflict
with the
judgments
of his
closest
advisers,
shaped
the
course
of the
war.
Foremost
was his
public
vow that
Washington
would
not
commit
troops
to the
conflict,
which
took a
key
bargaining
chip off
the
table
but laid
down a
marker
for the
American
public
wary of
new
foreign
entanglements.
Biden,
according
to
Woodward,
felt
past
Russian
aggression
had been
badly
mismanaged
by his
predecessors,
including
the one
he had
served,
Barack
Obama.
“Barack
never
took
Putin
seriously,”
Biden
told a
close
friend.
Biden’s
own
blunders
were
costly,
the book
reveals.
In
January
2022, he
seemed
to
undercut
American
resolve
by
raising
the
possibility
that
Russia
might
seek
only a
“minor
incursion.”
His
national
security
adviser,
Jake
Sullivan,
had to
do
damage
control
with
counterparts
in nine
NATO
countries,
in
addition
to
Japan,
Woodward
reveals.
Woodward
writes
that
Biden’s
most
delicate
diplomacy,
however,
involved
seeking
to
foreclose
Russia’s
nuclear
option.
In the
fall of
2022,
that
option
seemed
like a
live
one, as
U.S.
intelligence
agencies
reported
that
Putin
was
seriously
weighing
use of a
tactical
nuclear
weapon —
at one
point
assessing
the
likelihood
at 50
percent.
An
especially
frantic
quest to
bring
Moscow
back
from the
brink
came in
October
of that
year,
when
Russia
appeared
to be
laying
the
groundwork
for
escalation
by
accusing
Ukraine
of
preparing
to
detonate
a dirty
bomb.
Biden’s
team
confronted
similar
hair-raising
moments
with the
Israelis,
Woodward
reports,
foreshadowing
Netanyahu’s
recent
campaign
against
Hezbollah,
the
Lebanon-based
militant
group
and
Iranian
proxy,
in an
explicit
rejection
of U.S.
calls
for a
cease-fire.
In a
parallel
of
unsubstantiated
Russian
claims
of
Ukraine’s
intention
to use a
dirty
bomb,
the
Israelis
seemed
poised,
in the
days
after
Oct. 7,
2023, to
launch a
preemptive
strike
against
Hezbollah
based on
what
American
experts
deemed
“phantom”
warnings
of
Hezbollah
mobilization
along
Israel’s
northern
border.
“The
Israelis
always
do
this,”
was the
reaction
of Brett
McGurk,
Biden’s
Middle
East
coordinator,
according
to the
book.
“They
claim
‘We got
the
intel!
You’ll
see it.
You’ll
see it.’
But like
50
percent
of the
time the
so-called
intel
doesn’t
actually
show
up.”
Apparent
drones
reported
by the
Israelis
turned
out to
be
birds.
Yet the
book
also
shows
how the
Biden
administration
did
little
to alter
its
policy
toward
Israel
even as
senior
U.S.
officials
abandoned
their
belief
that the
government
in
Jerusalem
was
operating
in good
faith.
Already
in the
days
after
Oct. 7,
Blinken’s
impression
of
Defense
Minister
Yoav
Gallant’s
approach
was: “It
doesn’t
matter
how many
people
die. I
have a
mission
to
eradicate
Hamas
and it
doesn’t
matter
how many
Palestinians
die. It
doesn’t
matter
how many
Israelis
die.”
Biden,
according
to
Woodward,
was
cautious
about
setting
limits
on
Israel’s
conduct
lest
Netanyahu
blow
past
them. In
a
one-on-one
call in
April,
Netanyahu
promised
Biden
that the
Rafah
offensive
would
take
only
three
weeks, a
vow the
American
president
never
took
seriously.
“It’ll
take
months,”
Biden
replied.
To
associates,
Biden
complained
that
Netanyahu
was a
liar
only
interested
in his
political
survival.
And he
concluded
the same
of the
prime
minister’s
associates,
saying
that 18
out of
19
people
who work
for
Netanyahu
are
“liars.”
At the
same
time,
support
for the
Biden
administration’s
Middle
East
policy
came
from
unexpected
places,
the book
reveals.
Before
the Oct.
7
attacks,
Sen.
Lindsey
Graham
(R-S.C.),
a loyal
Trump
lieutenant
and
shape-shifter
who went
from an
outspoken
critic
of Saudi
Crown
Prince
Mohammed
bin
Salman
to a
trusted
interlocutor,
had
relayed
information
to Biden
about
prospects
for the
normalization
of
relations
between
Saudi
Arabia
and
Israel.
Graham
believed
normalization
was best
completed
under
Biden,
arguing
that
congressional
Democrats
would be
reluctant
to lend
support
to a
Trump-sponsored
initiative.
Graham
promised
he could
deliver
the
Republican
votes.
After
Oct. 7,
Graham
continued
to
engage
with the
crown
prince.
During a
March
visit by
the
senator
to
Riyadh,
which is
recounted
by
Woodward,
Graham
proposed
a phone
call
with
Trump,
so the
crown
prince
pulled
out a
burner
phone
labeled
“TRUMP
45.” In
earlier
meetings,
the
crown
prince
had
brandished
other
such
devices,
including
one
labeled
“JAKE
SULLIVAN”
for
Biden’s
national
security
adviser.
During
the
March
call
with
Trump,
conducted
by the
crown
prince
over
speakerphone
while
Graham
was
present,
the
former
president
teased
the
senator
for once
calling
for the
Saudi
royal’s
ouster
over the
assassination
of
Washington
Post
columnist
Jamal
Khashoggi,
which
the CIA
concluded
Mohammed
had
ordered.
Graham
brushed
it off,
professing
to have
been
wrong
about
the
autocrat.
The
royal
court in
Riyadh,
however,
is not
the
comparison
Graham
uses
when
describing
visits
to
Trump’s
residence
at
Mar-a-Lago.
According
to
Woodward,
the
senator
invokes
an even
more
brutal
form of
authoritarianism.
“Going
to
Mar-a-Lago
is a
little
bit like
going to
North
Korea,”
the book
quotes
Graham
as
saying.
“Everybody
stands
up and
claps
every
time
Trump
comes
in.”
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